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ABSTRACT 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) Installations and Logistics (I&L) is 
concerned over the expenditures on organizational and intermediate (O&I)-level 
maintenance repairables and consumables, and their effects on future budget requests. 
Additionally, determining the effect of O&I cost-drivers, such as inventory, operating 
tempo (OPTEMPO), equipment age, procurement costs, etc., has not been thoroughly 
examined. Developing a cost-estimating relationship with maintenance costs, these cost-
drivers variables can help explain the factors that affect costs and why they vary. Prior 
studies have analyzed maintenance costs and have suggested various prediction methods. 
The Marine Corps has yet to implement a quantitative forecasting method to predict 
maintenance costs. As such, this thesis analyzes and suggests methods to predict future 
budgets at the Marine Force (MARFOR) level using the Operating and Support (O&S) 
Cost Estimating Guide dated October 2007 as a reference for developing cost-estimating 
relationships.  
This thesis focuses on the following three MARFORs: (1) Marine Forces Pacific, 
(2) Marine Forces Command, and (3) Marine Forces Reserve. This thesis creates a 
performance-pricing model for the USMC planners to use as an analytical tool to support 
sustainment budgetary requirements in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) process. This thesis continues the work of LCDR Patrick Kelly. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
 What parametric cost estimating models (e.g., ordinary least squares, 
autoregressive integrative moving average, etc.) can explain and predict a 
Marine Force’s level of spending for organizational and intermediate level 
part charges? 
2. Secondary Questions 
 How much do the Marine Forces annually spend on organizational and 
intermediate part charges for Marine Corps Bulletin 3000 equipment? 
 Can changes in operational tempo and equipment reliability be used to 
explain budget changes? 
 How valid are the data from Visibility and Management of Operating and 
Support Costs and Marine Corps Logistics Command? 
B. EXAMINING ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE PART COSTS 
IN THE MARINE CORPS  
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) is concerned over the expenditures on 
organizational and intermediate (O&I)-level consumables and secondary repairables 
(SECREPs), and their effects on future budget requests. Additionally, determining the 
effect of O&I cost-drivers, such as inventory, operating tempo (OPTEMPO), equipment 
age, procurement costs, etc., has not yet been examined. Developing a relationship 
between cost and these variables helps to understand the factors that affect costs and why 
they vary. Although prior studies have analyzed spare part costs and suggested prediction 
methods, the Marine Corps has yet to implement quantitative forecasting measures to 
predict maintenance costs (Cucinotta, 1997; Klein, 2005; Klein, 2009). As such, this 
thesis analyzes and suggests methods to predict future expenditures on consumables and 
SECREPs at the Marine Force (MARFOR) level using the Operating and Support (O&S) 
Cost Estimating Guide dtd October 2007 as a reference for developing cost-estimating 
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relationships. This thesis focuses on the following three MARFORs: (1) Marine Forces 
Pacific (MARFORPAC), (2) Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) and (3) Marine 
Forces Reserve (MARFORRES). Marine Corps Logistics Command 
(MARCORLOGCOM) and Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) 
provided the part charge data for this thesis. This thesis focuses strictly on the Marine 
Corps Bulletin (MCBUL) 3000 Table of Authorized Material Control Number 
(TAMCN)1 weapon systems. 
The Marine Corps Installation and Logistics (I&L) Command initiated this thesis 
due to growing concerns that the Marine Corps has not found accurate methods to predict 
the cost of O&I level consumables and SECREPs. Although analysts have studied 
maintenance cost drivers, gathering accurate, complete data has been a major 
impediment. With future Department of Defense (DoD) budgets on the decline and the 
wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan potentially winding down, finding ways to predict 
these costs accurately is imperative. The most recent study on maintenance cost 
estimation techniques discussed the growing number of new weapon systems in the 
Marine Corps’ inventory to support Commander’s requirements for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As such, Marine Corps Systems 
Command (MARCORSYSCOM) personnel are concerned with the growing inventory’s 
cost of consumables and SECREPs and the resulting budgetary implications (Klein, 
2009). 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis creates a performance-cost model for the USMC planners to use as an 
analytical tool to support sustainment budgetary requirements in the PPBE process. This 
thesis focuses on O&I funding requirements by MARFOR. Additionally, this thesis 
places special emphasis on the initial models that LCDR Patrick Kelly developed, 
entitled “United States Marine Corps Performance Pricing Model” (2009). This thesis  
 
                                                 
1 A TAMCN is a supply-unique description code given to a Principal End Item (PEI) consisting of (1) 
Commodity Designator, and (2) Item Number. 
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also refines and amplifies LCDR Kelly’s models by examining cost relationships and 
evaluating their explanatory and predictive power. The remainder of the introduction 
discusses the limitations and scope of this thesis. 
D. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The MCBUL 3000 changes annually and has changed substantially since OIF and 
OEF, incorporating new equipment into the Marine Corps inventory. Therefore, historical 
data may be minimal to non-existent for some TAMCNs. A similar problem of 
insufficient data exists for MARFORSOC as well, leading this study to exclude it from 
analysis. For example, in 2010, MARFORSOC will have four years worth of historical 
data, which should provide a solid indicator as to what drives O&I level part charges.  
Additionally, by employing data incorporated in the USMC MERIT database, this 
study does not capture payments to maintenance contractors, such as Raytheon and 
Oshkosh, for repairs. Instead, this study captures the procurement cost of the SECREP 
being repaired by the contractor. Consequently, this study’s forecasting model 
systematically overestimates actual part cost expenditures. This study also does not 
capture the credits and reverse credits that the sources of supply fund back to the 
MARFORs. To compsensate for this overestimation, one can use a cost-factor technique 
to account for actual expenditures on SECREP repair. 
One would normally expect OPTEMPO to have a significant effect on the repair 
cost of consumables and SECREPs. However, there is no consistent method to measure 
the OPTEMPO for every MCBUL 3000 TAMCN. For example, analysts measure a 
vehicle’s OPTEMPO in miles driven. On the other hand, for the majority of the Alpha 
(communications) TAMCNs, Bravo (engineering) TAMCNs, Charlie (chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear/general supply) TAMCNs, and some Echo (ordnance) 
TAMCNs, OPTEMPO is measured in rounds, hours, or days.2 Consequently, this study  
 
 
                                                 
2 OPTEMPO can be measured by (1) miles driven, (2) hours of operation, (3) days in use, and (4) 
rounds fired depending on what the PEI is, and if accurate and reliable data tracks this type of information.  
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does not include OPTEMPO data. Finally, this study does not include costs for some of 
the new TAMCNs in the MCBUL 3000 (dtd 14 January 09) because the cost data was not 
available until October 2009, after this study’s data analysis had begun. 
E. RESEARCH SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on three cost elements using MARCORLOGCOM and 
MARCORSYSCOM data. These cost elements are Organizational Level Consumables, 
Intermediate Level Consumables, and Intermediate Level Repair Parts. The Operating 
and Support Cost Estimating Guide defines organizational and intermediate maintenance 
consumables and repairables as follows. 
Organizational Maintenance—The cost of materials and other costs used 
to maintain a primary system, training devices, simulators, and support 
equipment. 
 Organization-Level Consumables—This includes the cost of 
material consumed in the maintenance and support of a primary 
system and its associated support and training equipment at the 
unit level. 
 Organization-Level Repair Parts—This includes the costs of 
material used to repair primary systems and associated support and 
training equipment at the unit level. 
Intermediate Maintenance—The cost of materials including the support 
costs expended by intermediate level maintenance organization in support 
of a primary system, simulators, training devices, and associated support 
equipment. 
 Intermediate Level Consumable Parts—The specified cost of 
government furnished consumable materials used in maintaining 
and repairing a primary system, simulator, training devices, and 









 Intermediate Level Repair Parts—The specified cost of the parts 
used in maintaining and repairing a primary system, simulator, 
training devices, and associated support equipment by 
intermediate-level maintenance activities (2007).3  
The objective is to develop a model, or models, that support the Marine Corps’ 
forecasting of specified O&I costs. This thesis focuses on developing cost estimating 
relationships (CERs) for MCBUL 3000 TAMCNs, which are those with significant 
consumable and SECREP part costs.  
                                                 
3 The above definitions were taken directly from the OSD Cost Estimating Guide. This study does not 
include the cost of labor. This study only includes SECREP and consumable part charges, which are 
referred to as part charges. A part charge is based on the determined administrative prices, including 
Exchange Price and Standard Price. 
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II.  BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
BACKGROUND 
A. HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS I&L 
The Marine Corps I&L department conducts the Sustainment Program Evaluation 
Board (PEB) as part of the PPBE process. Accordingly, HQMC must estimate the future 
funds required to support equipment maintenance worldwide. Since these estimates 
compete with other United States Marine Corps (USMC) funding needs, analysts must 
base them on reliable data using defensible methodologies. 
In support of I&L’s priorities, the department needs to improve the defensibility 
of its estimates in the current budgetary environment. The results of this effort directly 
support Marines by providing a basis for justifying maintenance funding at the required 
levels. Additionally, accurate cost estimates allow comptrollers to apportion funds 
properly across HQMC requirements.  
B. OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS 
The Congressional Budgeting Office (CBO) conducted a study in 1988 on O&S 
costs for the DoD. This was a period when the DoD budget grew approximately two 
percent per year from 1980 to 1988 in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. The DoD became 
concerned that defense budgets would remain constant or steadily decline in the near 
term. This would have created adverse consequences for funding programs already in the 
development or procurement phase. The CBO employed several methods to estimate the 
amount of O&S funding needed over the course of five years (1988). As a result, the 
CBO study stimulated interest in finding ways to reduce O&S costs and its effects on 
readiness. 
O&S costs consist of sustainment costs incurred from the initial system 
deployment through the end of system operations. This includes all costs of operating, 
maintaining, and supporting a fielded system. Specifically, the costs of personnel  
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(organic and contractor), equipment, supplies, services associated with operating, 
modifying, maintaining, supplying, training, and supporting a system in the DoD 
inventory (DoD, 2007). 
In October 2007, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG) published the Operating and Support Cost Estimating 
Guide. The purpose of this guide is twofold: (1) review and explain policies and 
procedures focused on the preparation, documentation, and presentation of system O&S 
cost estimates, and (2) identify and define a set of standard categories of O&S Cost 
Elements. Analysts accomplish most O&S cost estimates using a combination of three 
estimating approaches. 
 Parametric Method—This method uses regression or other statistical 
methods to develop Cost Estimating Relationships (CER). Two subtypes 
of this method are the following. 
 Actual Costs method—With this method, actual cost experience or 
trends are used to project future costs for the same system. 
 Cost Factors—Factors applicable to certain cost elements not 
related to weapon system characteristics. Often considered simple 
per capita factors applied to direct system manpower to estimate 
indirect cost elements. 
 Analogy Method—This method is used to estimate a cost based on 
historical data for one analogous system(s).  
 Engineering Estimate—This method uses discrete estimates of labor and 
material costs for maintenance and other support functions. The system 
being costed normally is broken down into lover-level components (such 
as parts or assemblies), each of which is costed separately (2007). 
This analysis employs parametric methods to explain and predict the relevant 
costs. 
C. MCBUL 3000 
The MCBUL 3000 is a listing of principal end items (PEIs) and Mission Essential 
Equipment (MEE) established by the Marine Corps to capture ground equipment 
readiness of all Marine Corps Units (HQMC, 2009). The Marine Corps classifies all 
MCBUL 3000 TAMCNs as Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System 
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(MARES) reportable equipment. This equipment is of the highest importance, which 
Marine Commanders and staffers continuously monitor to ensure maintenance readiness 
levels throughout the Marine Corps do not hinder operational readiness.4 Each calendar 
year, the Marine Corps updates the MCBUL 3000 with additions and deletions of 
MARES reportable equipment. As of this writing, the most current MCBUL 3000 
contains 228 TAMCNs, 68 of which are MEE items. This is an increase of 112 TAMCN 
from the year prior. The MCBUL 3000 lists TAMCNs in alphanumeric order, grouping 
them into the following commodity classes. 
 A—Communications/Electronics 
 B—Engineering 
 C—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear(CBRN)/General Supply 
 D—Ground Transport  
 E—Ordnance (2009) 
D. VAMOSC  
The VAMOSC program began in the 1970s based on a General Accounting 
Office (GAO) recommendation, subsequently mandated by Congress, that the DoD 
should accurately determine weapon system O&S costs (IBM, 2009). Under the guidance 
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) CAIG’s Cost Element Structure, DoD 
5000.4, OSD authorized each service to develop its own general VAMOSC program. 
Currently, VAMOSC includes the Navy's VAMOSC system, managed by the Naval 
Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA); the Marine Corps VAMOSC system, managed by the 
NCCA, the Air Force VAMOSC system, known as Air Force Total Ownership Cost 
(AFTOC) and managed by the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA); and the 
Army's Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS), managed by 
the Cost and Economic Analysis Center (CEAC). According to Cheshire (2001), the 
purpose of VAMOSC is to provide the following. 
                                                 
4 Maintenance readiness is only one part of operational readiness, which is the ability to accomplish 
assigned missions. Personnel training, staffing levels and logistics support are other factors that comprise a 
unit’s operational readiness. Maintenance readiness is the availability of an assigned table of equipment 
(TE). 
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 Visibility of O&S costs for use in cost analysis of major defense 
acquisition programs and force structure alternatives in support of the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process and 
satisfies the Congressional requirement that the DoD track and report 
O&S costs for major acquisition programs.  
 To provide visibility of critical maintenance and support costs at the 
subsystem level in sufficient detail to promote cost-conscious design and 
configuration management of new and fielded defense programs.  
 To provide visibility of O&S costs so they may be managed to reduce and 
control program life-cycle costs.  
 To improve the validity and credibility of O&S cost estimates by 
establishing a widely accepted database; thereby, reducing the cost and 
time for collecting these defense program O&S costs for specific 
applications (2001). 
E. MARINE CORPS VAMOSC 
In October 2000, the USMC Total Ownership Cost (TOC) Integrated Product 
Team and NCCA agreed to use VAMOSC as the vehicle for capturing, processing, and 
reporting O&S (IBM, 2009). Marine Corps VAMOSC focuses on ground combat 
equipment with supply and maintenance data dating back to fiscal year (FY) 1995 and 
inventory by location dating back to FY 1998. Navy VAMOSC tracks Marine Corps 
aviation assets. To date, Marine Corps VAMOSC is improving its capabilities as more 
usage data becomes available. Table 1 lists the current capabilities that Marine Corps 
VAMOSC provides to its end users:  
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Table 1.   Current USMC VAMOSC Capabilities (From: IBM, 2009) 
At the close of the FY, MARFORLOGCOM and MARFORSYCOM provide data 
that Marine Corps VAMOSC requires to update its database. Most of the data originates 
from the Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS), Marine Corps 
Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS), and Supported Activities 
Supply System (SASSY). Supply and maintenance personnel within the Marine Corps 
use these systems to track readiness and inventory, as well as to management the 
requisition of repair parts, equipment, and materials.  
ATLASS is a deployable, microcomputer-based supply system that integrates the 
functionality of the Landing Force Asset Distribution System (LFADS) and the Personal 
Computer Support Activities Supply System (PC SASSY) to provide the ability to 
control, distribute, and replenish equipment and supplies in assigned areas of operation, 





SASSY is the primary retail supply accounting system for the Marine Corps that 
provides functions, such as stock replenishment, requirements determination, receipts, 
inventory, stock control and asset visibility. SASSY maintains requisition and 
accountability files for both using units and intermediate levels of inventory (Jackson, 
2009).  
MIMMS is a standardized system providing for effective maintenance 
management related to organizational and intermediate maintenance throughout the 
Marine Corps. A variety of reports contain active maintenance and repair part 
information for effective maintenance production and engineering practices at all levels. 
Finally, MIMMS provides timely and accurate information on the equipment in the 
maintenance cycle (Jackson, 2009). 
As of this writing, Marine Corps VAMOSC tracks 429 TAMCNs. Additionally, 
Marine Corps VAMOSC will not upload the most current MCBUL 3000 TAMCNs until 
after the FY09 closeout, usually in November.  
F. MARINE CORPS EQUIPMENT READINESS INFORMATION TOOL 
(MERIT) 
MERIT is a web-enabled tool that graphically depicts the current readiness 
posture and detailed supply and maintenance information for all Marine Corps readiness 
reportable TAMCNs. In November 2000, the Materiel Command, now known as 
MARCORLOGCOM, formed the Materiel Readiness Integrated Product Team (MRIPT), 
which brought together a cross-functional team that focused on material readiness policy, 
calculations, displays, reporting and procedures. MERIT has evolved and now transforms 
data into valuable information that provides a view of equipment readiness by commodity 
and functional area. MERIT gives Force Commanders visibility of their readiness trends, 
problems and associated causes. It also provides detailed information essential to 
maintainers, Logistics Management Specialists, Program Managers (PMs), and analysts. 
Material readiness is an issue that affects the entire Marine Corps, so the Marine Corps 
transitioned from a reactive to a proactive life cycle management process by 
implementing MERIT (MARCORLOGCOM, 2009).  
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MERIT recently created “Total Support Cost” to report O&I-level expenditures. 
Unlike VAMOSC, the Marine Corps updates MERIT daily. Additionally, Commanders 
can first look at broad readiness, but can also look at readiness and cost levels of 
subordinate units. Table 2 lists O&I level maintenance costs broken down by major 
commands (MARCORLOGCOM, 2009).  
n 
 
Table 2.   Screenshot from MERIT Total Support Cost (From: MARCORLOGCOM, 
2009) 
After analyzing MERIT and VAMOSC, the decision was to focus on MERIT cost 
data. While both systems have well-defined filtering logic, the Marine Corps is more 
familiar with MERIT and trusts its capabilities.  
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section examines the methodologies and findings of prior cost estimation 


















































Table 3.   Summary of Literature Review 
1. The Effects of Equipment Age on Spare Part Cost 
Fan et al. (2005) found no statistically significant evidence to support the claim 
that age has a positive effect on spare part cost for U.S. Army ground equipment. Fan 
analyzed M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams Tank data and argued that exogenous factors hinder 
a proper study of the age effect on the spare parts costs of the Abrams Tank. Fan 
concluded that analyzing more refined data might lead to evidence of an age effect. On 
the other hand, Fan argued that OPTEMPO and equipment location are worthy predictors 
of spare part cost. 
Fan (2005) noted four factors that hinder a proper analysis of the effect of age on 
spare part costs. First, while field labor accounts for more than half of the Army’s 
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maintenance cost, the Army does not capture labor cost as fully as it does spare part cost. 
Second, the parts budgeting process artificially reduces spare parts spending. Once a 
budget is set, it is nearly impossible for a unit to obtain funding increases. In addition, the 
Army does not track unfunded maintenance requirements. Third, Army units may go 
outside the normal supply system when funds are low. For example, instead of ordering a 
new part, a unit might ask a civilian or base mechanic to fix the defect, circumventing the 
Army supply system. As a result, the Army does not capture this data.  
2. Aircraft Age 
Pyles (2003) looked at the effects of aging aircraft on maintenance requirements, 
using up to 40 years of data. He cautioned that longer forecasts increase the potential for 
unforeseen factors to manifest themselves, causing an increase in the statistically 
necessary width of confidence intervals5.  
Pyles (2003) found that, in general, aircraft age has a positive effect on 
maintenance workloads. Additionally, he noted that procurement cost has a positive 
effect on maintenance workloads and part consumption. Finally, Pyle found that demand 
declines for General Support Division consumables after 20–40 years; however, he 
cautioned that he desired more years of data to confirm that the slight decline in demand 
was not actually demand leveling off. 
3. Estimating Sustainment Costs 
Klein (2005) found that the Marine Corps annually spends six to eight percent of 
a system’s procurement cost on operations and maintenance (O&M). While he did not 
state that planners should rely on his study when defending budgets, his paper argues that 
procurement cost of the TAMCN should be one of many quantitative indicators in a 
planner’s toolkit. Klein used Navy and Marine Corps VAMOSC data to conduct his 
research.  
                                                 
5 Pyles also noted that the central limit theorem submits that independent variables may cancel each 
other out. 
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To enhance the credibility of his findings, Klein (2009) used data from MERIT’s 
Total Support Cost module, the Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS) and 
the Total Life Cycle Management-Common Operating Picture, in addition to Navy and 
Marine Corps VAMOSC. Next, he examined the procurement to O&M ratios for groups 
of equipment. For example, communication TAMCNs may have different ratios than 
vehicle TAMCNs. Finally, Klein explored the effects of age, OPTEMPO and 
environment on O&M costs. 
Klein (2009) concluded that there are significant differences in the procurement to 
O&M ratios among commodities. Additionally, he confirmed that deployed TAMCNs 
require more maintenance. Just as important, Klein cautioned that the procurement to 
O&M ratios among different TAMNCs of the same commodity often vary. In addition, 
he was not able to determine the age effect on O&M cost, submitting that USMC 
VAMOSC does not include enough data. Therefore, he did not conduct parametric cost 
analysis. As such, this paper uses Klein’s research as a platform for further analysis.  
4. Budget Estimating Relationships for Depot-Level Repairables in the 
Air Force Flying Hour Program 
Hildebrandt (2007) found strong predictors of depot-level repairable cost in the 
Air Force Flying Hour Program. First, fighter aircraft missions result in more repairable 
expenditures than non-fighter missions do. Additionally, procurement cost, flying hours, 
aircraft age, and landings per sortie positively affect repairable cost. As such, this 
analysis evaluates the effects of procurement cost, age, inventory, and other variables on 
maintenance cost. Next, he found that average sortie duration negatively affects 
repairable cost. Finally, Hildebrandt built regression models with and without serial 
correlation. He found that both models are statistically significant as a whole. 
Additionally, while the coefficients of his explanatory variables are slightly different in 
each model, the variables are the same sign and statistically significant in both models. 
Hildebrandt (2007) systematically built and explained his regression model. First, 
he defined repairable cost and its measurement. Next, he compared then-year versus 
current-year dollar repairable expenditures. Then, he specified his model, discussing 
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reasons for including potential explanatory variables. In his discussion of variables, he 
noted each variable’s trend over a multi-year period. Finally, Hildebrandt concluded with 
his model’s limitations, including the need for more data before applying it to 
contingency environments. He also included the need to change the model when the Air 
Force changes its accounting rules. 
5. Relationship between Usage and O&S Costs for Air Force Aircraft 
When the relationship between OPTEMPO and O&S costs is not proportional, 
analysts should separate costs into their fixed and variable components (Unger, 2008). 
Unger found that the doubling of flying hours does not lead to the doubling of total O&S 
costs. Instead, Unger found that maintenance costs increase 56 percent when flying hours 
double. Unger argued that fixed costs are significant; therefore, analysts should separate 
O&S costs into their fixed and variable elements. 
Unger (2008) addressed how to deal with high levels of multicollinearity. In his 
study, flying hours and inventory were so highly correlated that he could not easily 
determine which variable to include in his model. He chose flying hours, because there 
was a near perfect relationship between fuel consumption and flying hours. Therefore, he 
chose the explanatory variable most correlated with the dependent variable. 
Unger (2008) concluded with recommendations for defense planners. When 
analysts forecast an increase in flying hours, planners should request less than a 
proportional increase in O&S funds to fund other requirements. More importantly, when 
analysts forecast a decrease in flying hours, planners should request less than a 
proportional decrease in funds to avoid a backlog. When dealing with an 11.5 billion 
dollar budget, maintenance funds keep over $400 million more in funding than following 
the traditional, proportional approach. Thus, Unger’s research is most applicable during 
OPTEMPO transitions, which occur if OIF OPTEMPO reductions outweigh OEF 
OPTEMPO increases. 
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6. Estimating U.S. Army O&S Cost Relations 
Hildebrandt and Sze (1990) found statistically significant relationships between 
OPTEMPO, acquisition cost and the O&S cost of ground vehicles, using the Army’s 
OSMIS. They noted that OSMIS, unlike VAMOSC, does not capture Army personnel 
costs. While the OSD includes support personnel in its O&S cost definition, the Army 
does not include it in OSMIS because it views personnel costs as fixed. Hildebrandt and 
Sze grouped the Army’s ground vehicles into three classes: (1) direct combat, (2) fire 
support, and (3) combat service support.  
Hildebrandt and Sze (1990) used a log-linear ordinary least squares (OLS) model 
to develop cost-estimating relationships. They argued that a log-log model is ideal for 
many reasons. First, due to the intricacies of and correlation between their explanatory 
variables, a non-linear cost relation exists, which log-log OLS models can compute. 
Second, the coefficients of log-log models represent percentage changes in the dependent 
variable and are easy to interpret. Finally, log-linear models correct heteroskedasticity, 
which is a biased variance in the error term. Due to these factors, the authors also 
emphasize log-log models.6 
Hildebrandt and Sze (1990) found a way to correlate design characteristics to 
O&S costs. While design characteristics and O&S costs are correlated, different design 
characteristics are highly correlated with each other, which results in the regression 
problem of multicollinearity. Therefore, Hildebrandt and Sze treated acquisition cost as 
an aggregate of design characteristics; thereby, replacing multiple explanatory variables 
with one. Additionally, Hildebrandt and Sze argued that acquisition cost is a valid O&S 
cost driver, because they viewed repair parts as a type of remanufacturing. 
A direct combat vehicle’s miles, rounds and acquisition cost have a positive effect 
on O&S costs (Hildebrandt and Sze, 1990). Additionally, Hildebrandt and Sze discovered 
a similar effect of OPTEMPO and acquisition cost on organizational level maintenance 
costs for Air Force fighter aircraft and Army direct combat vehicles. Next, for artillery 
                                                 
6 We use log-log models instead of unit space models. Unit space models are the simplest models, 
listing all variables in their original form. For example, one would regress cost on inventory in a unit space 
model to determine the effect of a one-unit change in inventory on cost. 
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vehicles, the rounds variable has the strongest effect on O&S costs. In addition, the miles 
variable also has a positive effect on fire support O&S costs, but acquisition cost does 
not. Finally, combat service support vehicle O&S costs most strongly correlate with 
acquisition cost, although a statistically significant relationship between miles and O&S 
costs also exists.  
7. An Analysis of O&S Costs for U.S. Navy Ships 
Ting (1993) methodically built a model and identified personnel costs as having 
the strongest effect on O&S costs of U.S. Navy ships. First, Ting thoroughly validated his 
data source. Next, he specified his model, and identified and corrected for serial 
correlation, heteroskedasticity, and outliers. Lastly, Ting provided analysts with a tool to 
use when forecasting the impact of changing variables like OPTEMPO and personnel 
requirements on O&S costs. 
Ting used the following four-step process to validate his data: “(1), grouping data, 
(2) specification of each group, (3) use of robust regression method, and (4) treating 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity as factors that need to be addressed in pooled 
datasets” (1993, p. 8). This paper discusses Ting’s first two steps. First, Ting grouped his 
data into 10 classes of ships. Ships in the same class have similar OPTEMPO and 
weights. Next, he identified missing values to verify whether he had enough observations 
to continue. Ting found very few unexplainable values missing and had sufficient data to 
continue. 
Finally, Ting specified his model and ran regressions to validate the data from 
each class of ship. For example, he naturally concluded that personnel costs are a 
function of enlisted costs and officer costs. Additionally, because officers make more 
money than enlisted personnel do, Ting concluded that the coefficients of officers should 
be greater than enlisted and both should be positive. Therefore, Ting removed one of the 
classes of ships because the coefficient of enlisted personnel was greater than that of 
officers. Ting used this technique with OPTEMPO, maintenance costs, and overhaul and 
removed one additional ship class. Thus, Ting’s methods improved the credibility of his 
findings. 
 20
8. Methods of Statistical Analysis 
This section identifies and describes several methods of statistical analysis. This 
methodology chapter explains the applicability of these methods to the performance-cost 
problem that this thesis addresses.  
9. Stepwise Regression  
Stepwise regression can be useful for quickly developing predictive models, but it 
has a high potential for misuse (Robbins & Daneman, 1999). Analysts might use stepwise 
regression after developing a correlation matrix for the potential independent variables, 
and in conjunction with standard or hierarchical multiple regression. Finally, analysts 
should only use stepwise regression as a sole technique under specific circumstances, as 
described below. 
In stepwise regression, computer programs add and delete variables one at a time, 
based on their degree of added variance explanation, which can be measured by the ‘F’ or 
‘partial R’ statistic (Robbins & Daneman, 1999). Computer programs add and delete the 
same variables, regardless of the order that the analyst inputs. Thus, stepwise regression 
is a quick and easy technique that analysts can add to their toolkits. 
Robbins and Daneman (1999) concluded that analysts should only use stepwise 
regression as their sole method under three circumstances. 
 The research goal should primarily be to develop a predictive model. 
Analysts may only use it as a secondary or tertiary explanatory model.  
 The sample size should be at least 40 times as large as the number of 
explanatory variables.  
 Analysts should validate their stepwise regression model by randomly 
splitting their sample size in half. 
10. Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average Forecasting (ARIMA) 
Stevenson (2007) analyzed the forecasting ability of autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) models in a civilian setting that focused on the prediction of 
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property rents.7 Stevenson structured his article into five parts: an introduction, data 
requirements and methodology, forecasting evaluation, comparative forecasting accuracy, 
and concluding comments. Stevenson’s introduction includes a literature review, his 
objective, and a roadmap of his article. In data requirements and methodology, Stevenson 
noted the two data indices he used, and he explained how the ARIMA model forecasts 
property rents. In forecasting evaluation, Stevenson showed that an ARIMA model’s 
forecasting power depends on the data index used. In comparative forecasting accuracy, 
Stevenson explained the relative strengths and weaknesses of each data index. Finally, in 
his concluding comments, Stevenson summarized his findings and warned the reader of 
ARIMA’s limitations (Stevenson, 2007).  
Stevenson studied whether “in-sample measures of best-fit and also past 
forecasting accuracy bear any relation to future forecasting performance” (2007, p. 223). 
Stevenson aimed to use ARIMA models to test whether analysts should rely on historical 
data to predict future outcomes. The current economic recession adds relevance to 
Stevenson’s article. Currently, many financial experts (Olander et al., 2009) believe that 
influential economists and leaders have relied too much on quantitative models, which 
contributed to the recent global financial meltdown. In addition, Stevenson’s research 
question is significant, because not answering it keeps one from more thoroughly 
understanding ARIMA’s limitations (Booth, Colomb & Williams, 2008).  
Stevenson (2007) conducted a thorough literature review in the introduction, 
citing 15 different references. Stevenson cited both users and critics of forecasting 
techniques. For example, he noted that in the 1980s, scholars used mostly ordinary least 
squares models that relied on explanatory variables. Then, he discussed the use of 
ARIMA models in the 1990s, which were simple and did not rely on explanatory 
variables. As such, analysts used ARIMA models less for explaining and almost 
exclusively for predicting outcomes. Finally, Stevenson cited scholarly criticism of 
ARIMA models. He used the continued controversy over the use of ARIMA models to 
justify his examination of the topic in more detail. 
                                                 
7 ARIMA models use lagged forecast residuals and a dependent variable’s lagged values to forecast 
future values. 
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In addition, Stevenson cited experts to explain the need to use two different data 
indices. For example, he used the Jones Lang LaSalle Rent Index (JLL) because its 
property appraisers value actual properties. However, the appraisers gather data over a 
quarter, which incorporates the data into an artificially “smoothed element” (Stevenson, 
2007, p. 224). On the other hand, he used the CB Richard Ellis Prime Rent Index 
(CBREPRI) because its collectors pull their data at one point in time. However, the 
CBREPRI values hypothetical properties. Therefore, based on the literature, Stevenson 
anticipated criticism by using both types of indices to evaluate his ARIMA models. 
Stevenson (2007) described the mechanics of forecasting with ARIMA models. 
First, he defined ARIMA’s components. Next, he described how he would evaluate the 
15 different ARIMA models that he would produce. He noted that there are two widely 
used criteria to evaluate forecasting methods, and discussed the merits and limitations of 
each method. Stevenson again anticipated criticism by using both criteria to evaluate his 
models. Additionally, Stevenson indicated that the ARIMA model may perform poorly at 
predicting shifts, due to only four shifts in the data out of 60 possibilities. 
Stevenson next linked his results with his original research question. First, he 
explained his findings, citing that ARIMA models performed differently, based on which 
index he used. For example, Stevenson noted that the ARIMA model that performed best 
in eight of the eleven periods using the JLL index performed worst in six of eleven 
periods using the CBREPRI. Next, Stevenson used this evidence to support one of his 
reasons for cautioning against blindly using ARIMA models. Stevenson also used 
evidence to highlight strengths of ARIMA models. For example, he noted that ARIMA 
models are better suited for forecasting values using the JLL index, and that they are even 
better at predicting market shifts using the CBREPRI. Therefore, Stevenson concluded 
that ARIMA models might be useful for predicting shifts in rents, which is important to 
analysts (2007). 
Stevenson also related his findings to preexisting literature and research studies. 
For example, he cited a previous study that criticized ARIMA models for consistently 
under predicting rents. By using the CBREPRI, he demonstrated that ARIMA models  
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might actually over predict rents more often than under predict them. In addition, he 
stated that his results were weaker than another scholar’s results in terms of rank 
correlation (2007). 
Stevenson spent most of his analysis discussing the statistical significance of his 
results. In fact, he created a table that discussed statistical significance at the ten, five and 
one percent levels. However, Stevenson also argued that his findings have practical 
significance as well. He stated that ARIMA models are helpful in forecasting broad 
shifts, but that previous forecasting strength does not correlate with future forecasting 
ability. Finally, he argued that the JLL data might mislead users, because of their 
smoothing element. 
Stevenson used his results to provide three new takeaways. First, ARIMA models 
can be helpful in predicting general market developments, such as growth and downturn. 
On the other hand, analysts should not rely on ARIMA models to forecast precise market 
changes. Thus, macro-level forecasters should benefit more from ARIMA models than 
micro-level forecasters should. Finally, Stevenson highlighted the need for analysts to 
carefully select and scrutinize data, even if academics and professionals consider the data 
credible.  
11. Marine Corps O&M Budgeting Process  
The Marine Corps does not employ quantitative models to forecast budgets for 
O&I level consumables and SECREPs. Instead, the Marine Corps uses the “Budget Call” 
(Miller, 1999, p. 45) and “Budget Review” (Miller, 1999, p. 46) processes to a formulate 
budget estimate submissions from the program objective memorandum. In the former 
process, the Program and Resources (P&R) department of HQMC provides a budget 
ceiling to and requests budget plans from MARFOR Commands. MARFOR Commands 
require battalion sized units and higher to submit budget requests. In the latter process, 
P&R reviews budget submissions for reliability and conformity to the aggregate USMC 
budget. P&R might consider the more extensive use of quantitative forecasting 
techniques, such as those developed in this thesis, during its review process to enhance 
the credibility and defensibility of its budget to the DoD and Congress. 
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12. Analyzing USMC O&I Level Part Charges 
Kelly (2009) completed an initial analysis of USMC O&I maintenance costs.8 
Using raw MIMMS and SASSY data from FYs 2005 to 2008, Kelly (2009) organized his 
study into two phases, and used descriptive statistics to develop a preliminary forecasting 
tool for HQMC I&L. 
a. Phase One: Annual MARFOR Maintenance Costs per TAMCN 
Phase one attempted to assist planners in analyzing past O&I parts 
expenditures as part of the MARFOR’s annual budget requests (Kelly, 2009). First, Kelly 
created data worksheets for each Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBUL 3000) TAMCN broken 
down by the various MARFOR’s. Next, he populated each worksheet with annual O&I 
level consumables, SECREPs and maintenance costs, using FY 2008 constant dollars. He 
then summarized the O&I level maintenance costs for each FY. Additionally, he 
identified which TAMCNs consumed the majority of the O&I maintenance budget. 
Finally, Kelly calculated the mean and standard deviation of the TAMCN maintenance 
costs, and advised budget reviewers to question budgets that fall outside the standard 
deviation limits.  
b. Phase Two: Annual MARFOR Maintenance Costs per Inventory 
of TAMCN 
During phase two, Kelly divided the total O&I level maintenance costs by 
the number of MARFOR-possessed TAMCNs. For example, if MARFORPAC spent 
$100M on O level maintenance for High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 
(HMMWVs) and possessed 25, then on average, MARFORPAC spent $4M on O level 
maintenance per HMMWV. Finally, he calculated the mean and standard deviation of the 
maintenance costs, and advised budget reviewers to question budgets that fall outside the 
standard deviation limits.  
                                                 
8 LCDR Kelly included labor charges during both phases of his analysis. 
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H. CONCLUSIONS 
Three of Kelly’s (2009) findings are significant to the current phase of this study.  
 Twenty TAMCNs (not always the same 20) incur approximately 80 
percent of the Marine Corp’s maintenance expenditures.  
 There is a positive, although highly variable relationship, between 
TAMCN inventory levels and total maintenance expenditures.  
 Data from 2002–2004 overstate actual expenditures and could not be 
included in his study. 
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III.  MARINE CORPS MAINTENANCE PROCESS 
A. USMC MEF STRUCTURE 
The United States Marine Corps is currently broken down into eight Marine 
Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). This thesis only focuses on MEFs I–V, which comprise 
MARFORPAC, MARFORCOM, and MARFORRES.  
 I  MEF California (MARFORPAC) 
 II MEF North Carolina (MARFORCOM) 
 III MEF Okinawa (MARFORPAC) 
 IV MEF New Orleans (MARFORRES)  
 V MEF Hawaii (MARFORPAC)  
 VI MEF Blount Island Command 
 VII MEF Iraq/Afghanistan 
 VIII MEF Bases, Posts, and Stations 
B. THE MARINE CORPS MAINTENANCE PROCESS 
The Marine Corps maintenance process is broken down into three pillars: (1) 
organizational (using unit) level; (2) intermediate level; and (3) depot level. Each pillar is 
authorized to perform specific levels of maintenance.9 
C. EQUIPMENT REPAIR ORDER (ERO) 
Organizational and intermediate part charges for consumables and SECREPs is 
the focus of this thesis, so understanding the process between the using unit and the 
intermediate maintenance activity is crucial. The using unit is equipped with an organic 
                                                 
9 MARADMIN 583/03 defines the three pillars of maintenance as follows: Organizational Level: 
Includes expeditious assessment and maintenance conducted under battlefield conditions…Intermediate 
Level: Include inspection/in-depth diagnosis, modification, replacement, adjustment, and limited repair or 
evacuation/disposal of principal end items and their selected reparables and components/sub-components. 
Depot Level: Sustains equipment throughout its life cycle by performing major repair, overhaul, or 
complete rebuild of parts, subassemblies, assemblies or principal end items to include manufacturing parts 
and conducting required modifications, testing calibrating, and reclaiming. 
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maintenance and supply capability. An Infantry Battalion is an example of a using unit 
activity. When a TAMCN is inducted into the maintenance cycle at the using unit level, 
the maintenance personnel must first determine what the defect is. If they can fix the 
problem at the using unit level, then they open an Equipment Repair Order (ERO). If they 
cannot fix the problem, then the TAMCN is evacuated to the Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity (IMA). An ERO is a data sheet that a maintainer creates for maintenance 
tracking purposes. An ERO lists the type of maintenance required and the consumable 
parts required to fix the problem. Each ERO is assigned a unique ERO designation 
number similar to a personal identification number. Figure 1 is an example of an ERO 
worksheet. As the maintenance personnel draft the ERO, they are also simultaneously 
drafting an Equipment Repair Order Shopping List (EROSL). The EROSL lists all the 
consumable parts required to fix the open ERO. This EROSL is then given to the using 
unit supply shop for parts requisitioning.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Equipment Repair Order (ERO) (From: USMC, 1995) 
The using unit supply shop has the responsibility for placing all consumable parts 
on order, so the using unit maintenance shop can keep equipment readiness up. When the 
supply shop receives an EROSL from the maintenance shop, it immediately keypunches 
the transactions, which are then submitted through a currier to the SASSY Management 
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Unit (SMU) for further processing. The SMU falls under the Marine Corps Logistics 
Groups (MLG) Supply Battalion and warehouses all classes of supply. The SMU is 
considered the one stop shop for consumable repair parts to all ground units. Once the 
SMU receives the order, it checks its stock levels and if it has the parts on-hand, it 
immediately coordinates to have the parts shipped back to the supply shop. If it does not 
have the parts on-hand, the parts are placed on backorder and delivered once they arrive 
to the SMU. When the supply shop receives the consumable repair parts, it immediately 
transfers the parts to the maintenance shop. Finally, the maintenance shop closes the ERO 




Figure 2.   Equipment Repair Order Shopping List (EROSL) (From: USMC, 1995) 
D. REPAIRABLE ISSUE POINT 
The Repairable Issue Point (RIP) manages all SECREP items for ground 
equipment throughout the Marine Corps. SECREPS are considered high dollar items that 
can normally be fixed once they break. They are separated into two categories: (1) 
ground SECREPS, and (2) low density SECREPS. Examples of ground SECREPS 
include HMMWV transmissions and engines. Examples of low density SECREPS 
include satellite circuit cards and circuit boards. SECREPS cannot be repaired at the 
using unit level since they do not maintain this capability. When a SECREP breaks, the 
using unit maintenance shop takes the broken SECREP to the RIP and, if the RIP holds 
the part in inventory, there is one-for-one swap. If it does not possess the necessary part, 
three courses of action can be taken in which it can replenish or replace the broken 
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SECREP. The three courses of action include the intermediate maintenance activity 
(IMA), the Materials Return Program (MRP), and the Logistics Integrated Support (LIS) 
contractor.  
1. Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) 
The IMA is normally the first course of action the RIP pursues in getting the 
SECREP fixed. If the IMA is able to fix the SECREP, the item immediately goes back on 
the RIP’s shelf as serviceable stock. If the IMA is unable to fix the SECREP, the item is 
then returned to the RIP to pursue another course of action.  
2. Materials Return Program  
The MRP process is another alternative that the RIP pursues. At this time, the RIP 
is given disposition instructions for the unserviceable SECREP by the source of supply. 
In return, the source of supply provides a credit to the RIP. This credit is then transferred 
back to the RIP’s budget and can be applied to the purchase of additional SECREPS. 
Initially, the RIP pays the full unit price for the SECREP. The source of supply then 
determines the exchange price based on the condition and reparability of the 
unserviceable SECREP. MARCORLOGCOM in Albany, GA determines the exchange 
price. This is similar to turning in your unserviceable car battery to the auto shop and 
given a credit applicable to the purchase of a new battery.  
3. Logistics Integrated Support Contractor 
The LIS contractors, currently Raytheon and Oshkosh, are partnered with the 
RIPs to provide services such as materials acquisition for SECREPS, maintenance 
overhaul, and the remanufacture of parts (Raytheon, 2007; Oshkosh, 2006). When either 
the IMA or MRP process is unsuccessful or costly, the LIS contractors are then 
responsible to fix that same unserviceable SECREP. The Marine Corps does not possess 
adequate capabilities to fix all SECREPS. Thus, contractor support is a necessity. 










































Figure 3.   O&I Maintenance Process 
4. Organizational and Intermediate Level Budget Process 
When annual Operations and Maintenance budgets are approved, funds are 
transferred from the Department of the Navy to HQMC I&L. HQMC I&L then pushes 
the funding to the MARFORs and down to the MEFs. The MEFs are then responsible for 
breaking down these funds further to the division, wing, and the MLG. Each division, 
wing, and MLG then breaks down those funds further until they reach the using unit 
level.  
The using unit activity and the IMA are given annual O&M funds for 
maintenance expenditures. These funds are based on internal budget requests from supply 
and maintenance personnel. Using historical data, supply and maintenance personnel 
estimate their future requirements to create a base line budget request. This baseline  
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budget request is then submitted up the chain of command until all budget requests are 
consolidated at the MEF level. Once these budgets requests are approved, they are then 
forwarded to the MARFOR level.  
The using unit activity is authorized to perform first and second echelon 
maintenance if a TAMCN is rendered unserviceable. Any consumable parts ordered for 
that TAMCN via the EROSL are charged to that using unit activities budget. If a 
TAMCN cannot be fixed at the using unit level, that TAMCN is then evacuated to the 
IMA. It is the responsibility of the IMA to fix that TAMCN and pay for its repair parts. 
The using unit activity is not charged for the maintenance repairs once the TAMCN is 
evacuated to the IMA. 
5. RIP Funding  
The RIP receives O&M funds for the replenishment and replacement of 
SECREPS. All SECREPS currently on the RIP’s shelves are already owned by that MEF. 
When a unit turns in an unserviceable SECREP to the RIP, they conduct a one-for-one 
swap. The unit that turned in the unserviceable SECREP is not charged for the 
replacement of the serviceable SECREP.  
The IMA is usually the first course of action for the RIP when there is an 
unserviceable SECREP. If the IMA is able to fix the SECREP, then they pay for the 
repairs using its own O&M funds. The IMA’s submit a yearly budget for future 
maintenance expenditures based on historical data.  
The RIP uses its own O&M funds when the IMA is unable to fix an unserviceable 
SECREP. Using the MRP process, the RIP determines the appropriate source of supply 
for the replacement SECREP and initiates the buy transaction known as a ZRB SASSY 
transaction. The RIP pays full price for the SECREP and is given disposition instructions 
for the unserviceable SECREP. The source of supply determines the amount of credit the 
RIP receives for the unserviceable SECREP. Once the credit amount is determined, that 
amount of funding is returned back to the RIP’s O&M budget. Normally, the source of 
supply for the Marine Corps is MARCORLOGCOM.  
 33
The RIP’s third option for the repair of an unserviceable SECREP is to use LIS 
contractors. If the RIP determines that it is cost effective to use these contractors, they 
then hand them off the unserviceable SECREPs. The RIP keypunches a ZBE SASSY 
transaction to release the unserviceable SECREP to the contractor. A Military 
Interdependent Purchase Request (MIPR) is used to pay the contractor. A MIPR 
authorizes funds to an external agency that can perform the required work or service 
(MCO 7300.21A). This funding is then obligated and liquidated from the RIPs O&M 






































Figure 4.   O&M Funds Flow for SECREP and Consumable Replenishment and 
Replacement 
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E. THE STANDARD ACCOUNTING, BUDGETING AND REPORTING 
SYSTEM (SABRS) 
The official accounting system for the Marine Corps is SABRS (MCO 7300.21A 
2008). The purpose of SABRS is to track the Marine Corps’ expenditures of goods and 
services. “SABRS interfaces with SASSY and MIMMS to capture document numbers for 
repair parts and accountable items that were ordered, receipted for, or canceled” 
(MCCSSS 2004, p. 3). This system informs the end user how much funding is obligated 
and liquidated along with the current remaining funding balance.  
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IV.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis aims to identify and explain maintenance part charge drivers (i.e., 
explanatory variables), and develop an Autoregressive (AR) model to forecast part 
charges at the MARFOR level. The primary goal is to construct a statistically significant 
performance-cost estimating model. This study emphasizes the use of a policy response 
model. It also develops a log-log-linear model to explain part charges, using SPSS, a 
statistical software package. Gilster (1970) explains that a policy response model can 
enable policy makers to determine the likely effects of alternative shifts in policy on the 
dependent variable. The value of a policy response model relies on the dependence of 
criterion variables on undetermined policy variables, while the value of a forecasting 
model depends on the least error (Gilster, 1970). Even if a model has a low R2, but has 
highly significant explanatory variable coefficients, the effects on the dependent variable 
can still be explained and should not be detracted from the value of the model (Gilster, 
1970). The two most likely reasons for the simultaneous combination of a low R2 and 
highly significant variables are that significant factors are outside the model, and 
randomness. 
The secondary goal of this thesis is to introduce a forecasting technique to use 
when prediction is the goal. This study creates a suitable predictive model to forecast 
actual part charge expenditures in future years. This study defines part charges as the sum 
of consumable and SECREP part charges.  
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This thesis examines three dependent variables: consumable part charges, 
SECREP part charges and the sum of consumable and SECREP part charges. This study 
defines ‘part charges’ as the sum of consumable and SECREP part charges. MERIT 
provided consumable and SECREP part charge data for FY 2005–2008, organized by 
TAMCN, MEF, and year. First, these charges are converted to FY 2008 dollars using 
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NCCA inflation indices. Second, MEFs I, III and V are categorized as MARFORPAC, 
MEF II as MARFORCOM, and MEF IV as MARFORRES. Finally, the natural log (LN) 
of the part charges is computed, which facilitates the discussion in terms of percentage 
changes instead of unit changes.  
MERIT data was used instead of the raw MIMMS and SASSY data for a variety 
of reasons. First, Kelly (2009) found that the raw MIMMS and SASSY data overstated 
actual expenditures from 2002–2004 (2009).10 Second, MERIT data professionals 
process the data. Third, Marine Corps leaders have been using MERIT for over five 
years, increasing its credibility. Finally, the authors decided that MIMMS and SASSY 
include only consumable part charges.11 
Consumable part charges were defined as the amount of money a MARFOR 
spends on consumable parts inducted into the maintenance cycle in one fiscal year. Units 
replace consumable parts when broken; units do not repair consumable parts. Ball joints 
and mirrors are examples of consumable parts. 
SECREP part charges were defined as the amount of money a MARFOR spends 
on SECREPs for any given MCBUL 3000 TAMCN in one fiscal year. A SECREP is a 
component of the end item and not functional by itself (MCO P4790.2C, p. 62). Engines 
and transmissions are two examples of SECREPs. 
 Sum of SECREP and consumable part charges (i.e., part charges): the 
amount of money a MARFOR spends on SECREPs and consumable parts 
for any given MCBUL 3000 TAMCN in one fiscal year. 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variables used in the regressions include the following: LN part 
charges on LN inventory, LN average TAMCN cost, LN Mean Days Between 
                                                 
10 In 2002–2004, the raw MIMMs and SASSY data erroneously contained extended prices (quantity 
times a part’s unit price) in the unit price column of consumable parts. Therefore, when one multiplied the 
extended price by the actual price, he obtained a number erroneously higher by a factor of the quantity 
ordered. For example, if a unit ordered three engines for $30 each, the unit price would read “$90,” and the 
quantity ordered would read “3.” Consequently, the model would record $270 in part charges, instead of 
the actual amount of $90.  
11 MIMMS and SASSY data likely includes only part charges to repair SECPREPs at the IMA when 
calculating SECREP part charges, while MERIT also includes SECREP procurement charges. 
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Maintenance (MDBM), Average initial operational capability (IOC) year, Alpha 
TAMCN group indicator variable, Bravo TAMCN group indicator variable, Charlie 
TAMCN group indicator variable, Delta TAMCN group indicator variable, SECREP 
indicator variable, MARFORRES indicator variable, tracked vehicle indicator variable, 
and armored personnel carrier (APC) indicator variable. IOC year is in unit form to 
enable discussing the effect of a one-year change instead of a percentage-year change to 
increase clarity. Some explanatory variables, especially indicator variables, include only 
a limited number of TAMCNs. This thesis includes only the 2009 MCBUL 3000 
TAMCNs. With this introduction, note the following independent variables. 
 Inventory: the quantity of a TAMCN that a MARFOR possesses at a 
fixed point in time in one fiscal year. MARCORLOGCOM provided the 
TAMCN inventory data. 
 Average TAMCN cost: the average cost of a TAMCN. When TAMCNs 
include more than one variant, the average variant cost represents the 
average TAMCN cost. MARCORSYSCOM provided this data in FY 2009 
dollars, which were converted to FY 2008 dollars for the sake of direct 
comparability with parts cost. 
 MDBM: the average amount of days a TAMCN is operational (i.e., not in 
the maintenance cycle). MDBM is measured by ERO open and close dates 
for the same TAMCN. MDBM provides an indication of reliability. An 
increase in MDBM means that a TAMCN remains operational for a longer 
duration. MARCORSYSCOM provided this data using the System 
Operational Effectiveness (SOE) application. 
 Average IOC year: the average IOC of a TAMCN. There is not an 
accurate measure of age. However, Average IOC, which shows costs 
declining as IOC increases, can also be capturing some aging. If 
equipment with IOC years prior to the data set shows high part charges in 
recent years, this could be caused in part by aging. However, because 
costs may decline when Average IOC increases, there could also be a 
technological-enhancement component to this variable. To compute an 
ideal age variable, one needs both a TAMCN’s fielding and disposal 
schedule, which are not readily available. When TAMCNs include more 
than one variant, the average variant’s IOC represents the average 
TAMCN IOC. TFSMS provided this data. 
 Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta TAMCN group indicators: the effect 
of the TAMCN category on part charges, using the Echo TAMCN 
indicator as the reference variable. For example, only Alpha TAMCNs 
receive a value of “1” under than Alpha indicator variable, all other 
TAMCNs receive a value of “0.” 
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 SECREP indicator: this variable analyses whether or not a TAMCN with 
SECREP charges results in significantly different total part charges than 
TAMCNs with only consumable charges. For each MARFOR, only 
MCBUL 3000 TAMCNs with SECREP part charges receive a value of 
“1” under the SECREP indicator variable. 
 MARFORRES indicator: this variable analyses whether or not a 
MARFORRES TAMCN results in significantly different part charges than 
a TAMCN in MARFORPAC or MARFORCOM. All MCBUL 3000 
TAMCNs with parts charges in MARFORRES receive a value of “1,” 
while MARFORPAC and MARFORCOM receive a “0.”  
 Tracked vehicle indicator: this variable analyses whether or not tracked 
vehicles result in significantly different part charges than all other 
TAMCNs. All MCBUL 3000 TAMCNs classified as tracked receive a 
value of “1,” while all other TAMCNs receive a value of “0.” Tracked 
vehicles include tanks, tank recovery vehicles, and the three types of 
amphibious assault vehicles (e.g., personnel, command, and logistics). 
 APC indicator: this variable analyses whether or not APCs result in 
significantly different part charges than all other TAMCNs. All MCBUL 
3000 TAMCNs classified as APCs receive a value of “1” under the APC 
indicator variable. APCs include the up-armored HMMWV, armored 7-
tons, AAVs, and Light Assault Vehicles. 
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Table 4.   TAMCN Make-up of Explanatory Variables 
D. AUTOREGRESSIVE (AR) FORECASTING MODEL 
This study also introduces a forecasting method to use when the goal is prediction 
instead of policy response. An Autoregressive (AR) model is created, which uses cross-
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section, time series data to predict future part charges in MERIT. This study’s AR model 
considers serial correlation among the residuals.12 This study takes the following steps to 
develop an AR model forecast.  
 Use SPSS to create an AR model  
 Predict future value of explanatory variables by using their values in 
previous years to predict the values in 2009 and 2010. This assumes that a 
variable’s past value affects its future value. If unable to predict future 
values, use 2008 values. 
 For 2009, multiply each data point by the ˆ  given in the AR model 
output. For 2010, multiply by 2ˆ . 
 Exponentiate predicted values for 2009 and 2010.  




standard error of  the estimate   
 to eliminate 
the bias that results when a log dependent variable is only exponentiated 
(Wooldridge, 2008). 
 For each MARFOR, sum the total predicted consumable and SECREP 
part charges in the two forecasting levels across TAMCNs in each 
forecasting year. 
 Make adjustment when exponentiating. 
Multiple data sources were used to comprise the database used in this thesis for 
regression analysis. Table 5 lists the sources used along with the variables derived from 
these sources. There is not a single source or location that could have been used to extract 
the necessary data for this study. If future studies are to be conducted concerning the 
Marine Corps O&I part charge expenditures, having a single source to extract data from 
would be beneficial. The data already exists; it is a matter of compiling the data into a 





                                                 
12 The model is , , 1, , ,u ut i j t i j N   where ‘i’ stands for MARFOR and ‘j’ for TAMCN. The ‘ρ’ is assumed not 
to depend on ‘t’, ‘i’, or ‘j’. This assumption constitutes the simplest forecasting model that builds on the 








DATA SOURCE VARIABLE 
MARCORSYSCOM (USMC 
SOE ANALYSIS) MDBM 
MCBUL 3000 TAMCN TYPE (A,B,C,D,E) 
MARCORSYSCOM 
(MIMMS/SASSY) 
TAMCN UNIT COST and 
INVENTORY, BOTH BY MARFOR, 
FY 




MARINE CORPS VAMOSC OPTEMPO13 
MARCORLOGCOM 
(MERIT) PARTS COST, SECREP COST 
Table 5.   Data Sources  
                                                 
13 OPTEMPO was initially included in the OLS policy response model; however, the authors did not 
find a statistically significant relationship between OPTEMPO and part charges. This is potentially due to 
the OPTEMPO data being erroneously entered into the MIMMS database. 
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V.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The following section lists the explanatory variables’ likely effects on consumable 
and SECREP part charges.  
Some variables have positive effects on part charges, while others have negative 
effects. Additionally, some variables have indirect effects on part charges by their effect 
on other explanatory variables. Figure 5 depicts the predicted relationships between the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable. 
 Inventory: positive effect on part charges. Each time a MARFOR fields a 
new TAMCN, it must account for the subsequent part charges of the 
TAMCNs. The only exception to this is TAMCNs under warranty or 
under a HQMC maintenance contract. 
 Average TAMCN cost: positive effect on part charges. Since replacing 
parts is like remanufacturing, there should be a strong relationship 
between the cost of a TAMCN and the cost of its replacement parts.  
 Tracked vehicle indicator: positive effect on part charges, relative to 
TAMCNs not “tracked.” Tracked vehicles are maintenance intensive 
vehicles and should incur significantly more part charges than other 
TAMCNs. 
 MDBM: negative effect on part charges. The longer a vehicle stays out of 
the maintenance cycle, the less money spent on part repair and 
replacement. The Marine Corps requires units to induct broken equipment 
into the maintenance cycle (MCO P4790.2C). At times, mechanics may 
classify vehicles in “short funds” status, meaning there is no money to 
order repair parts; however, this status is rarely seen in maintenance 
reports, and its effect on part charges is negligible. 
 Average IOC year: negative effect on part charges. A larger IOC year 
signifies a newer TAMCN. For example, TAMCNs with IOCs of 2003 
and 2006 are five and two years-old, respectively, in 2008. IOC year is 
used as a rough proxy for aging.14  
 Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta group indicators: unknown effect on 
part charges, relative to Echo TAMCNs. If the Alpha indicator’s 
coefficient is .2, then Alpha TAMCNs increase part charges by 20% more 
than Echo TAMCNs. 
                                                 
14 There is generally a relationship between IOC year and aging due to technological enhancements. 
Newer equipment tends to be more reliable than older equipment. Therefore, newer equipment requires less 
maintenance and ages slower than older equipment. 
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 SECREP indicator: Effect on parts charges of SECREPs relative to 
consumables. SECREPs are typically more complex than consumables; 
thus, the SECREP indicator is expected to be positive, but the authors are 
going to wait to conclude on this matter until running empirical analysis. 
 MARFORPAC and MARFORCOM indicators: unknown effect on 
parts charges, relative to TAMCNs in MARFORRES. On one hand, non-
reserve units train more frequently, increasing part charges. On the other 
hand, there is more time for preventive maintenance in non-reserve units, 
decreasing part charges. 
 Tracks indicator: unknown effect on part charges, relative to TAMCNs 
that are not tracks. Tracks are part intensive, increasing consumables and 
SECREP part charges.  
 APC indicator: unknown effect on part charges, relative to TAMCNs that 
are not APCs. APCs are heavier than non-armored TAMCNs; therefore, 
may have higher part charges. However, it is not possible to be certain of 
the effect until empirical analysis is conducted.  
 
Figure 5.   Model Specification  
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VI. RESULTS 
This chapter contains three sections of data analysis: descriptive statistics, a 
policy response, and an AR forecasting. The descriptive statistics section discusses 
consumable and SECREPS part charges (i.e., part charges). The policy response section 
includes the results obtained when part charges are regressed on the explanatory 
variables. This model analyzes each explanatory variable’s effect on part charges, 
holding all other explanatory variables constant. Finally, the prediction section provides 
an introductory AR forecasting model.  
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. Total Part Charges 
Total Marine Corps parts costs increased by $30M from 2005–2008; however, 
this increase was not constant. Figure 6 shows large fluctuations in SECREP part costs, 
which led to overall part charge variability. For example, SECREP part charges doubled 
in 2006, leading total part charges to almost double. On the other hand, consumable part 



























Figure 6.   Total Marine Corps Part Charges 
 46
MARFORPAC’s part charges increased by $16M from 2005–2008. Like total 
Marine Corps part charges, this increase was not constant. Figure 7 shows large 
fluctuations in SECREP part charges, which led to overall part charge variability. From 
2006–2007, annual SECREP part charges increased by 50 and 40 percent, respectively. 
In 2008, SECREP part costs decreased by 20 percent. Annual consumable part charges 



























Figure 7.   MARFORPAC Part Charges 
MARFORCOM’s part charges increased by $11M from 2005–2008. Like 
MARFORPAC, MARFORCOM’s SECREP part charges changed significantly each 
year. SECREP part charges almost tripled in 2006, then decreased by 17 percent and 33 
percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Additionally, consumable part charges doubled in 
2006, then increased an average of 8 percent during the next two years. Figure 8 shows 





























Figure 8.   MARFORCOM Part Charges 
MARFORRES’ part charges increased by $8M from 2005–2008. MARFORRES’ 
consumable and SECREP part charges varied the most out of the three MARFORs, in 
terms of percentage changes. SECREP part charges tripled in 2006 and 2007, and then 
decreased by half in 2008. Consumable part charges decreased by 33 percent in 2006, and 
then increased by 56 percent and 26 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Figure 9 


























Figure 9.   MARFORCOM Part Charges 
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2. The Most Expensive TAMCNs to Maintain 
The Marine Corps directs approximately 70 percent of its part charge 
expenditures on 10 TAMCNs. These results are consistent with Kelly’s 2009 study; 
however, the difference in make-up of the top 10 TAMCNs warrants another look. For 
example, Kelly’s top two TAMCNs, the Tube-launched, Optical-sighted, Wire-guided 
TOW Launcher, and M2 Machine Gun, are 15th and 57th, respectively, using MERIT 
data. Figure 10 shows the part charges of the top 10 TAMCNs, and Table 6 shows the top 



























Figure 10.   USMC Average Annual Part Charge Expenditures on “Heavy Hitters” 
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TAMCN
Average Annual Part 
Charges
Cumulative 
Percentage of Total 
Part Charges
E1888 (M1A1 Tank) $19,565,478 22.46%
E0846 (AAVP7A1) $14,874,174 39.53%
A1503 (AN/TPS-59) $5,565,556 45.92%
E0947 (LAV-25) $4,814,162 51.44%
D1158 (M1123 HMMWV) $3,270,184 55.20%
E0665 (M198) $2,978,600 58.62%
D0198 (MK23/25 MTVR) $2,573,718 61.57%
D1125 (TOW Carrier) $2,359,299 64.28%
A2525 (TSQ-23) $2,356,068 66.98%
D0209 (MK48A1 LVS) $2,029,517 69.31%
Marine Corps "Heavy Hitters" as a % of Total Part Charges
 
Table 6.   USMC “Heavy Hitters” as a Percentage of Total Part Charges 
MARFORPAC’s top 10 TAMCNs differ from the Marine Corps as a whole by 
one TAMCN. MARFORPAC’s top 10 list includes the E1378 Tank Recovery Vehicles 
instead of the Logistics Vehicle System (LVS). MARFORPAC directs approximately 70 
percent of its part charge expenditures on 10 TAMCNs. Figure 11 shows the part charges 
of the top 10 TAMCNs, and Table 7 shows the top 10 TAMCNs as a percentage of total 






















Figure 11.   MARFORPAC Average Annual Part Charge Expenditures on “Heavy 
Hitters” 
TAMCN
Average Annual Part 
Charges
Cumulative 
Percentage of Total 
Part Charges
E0846 (AAVP7A1) $10,477,836 21.11%
E1888 (M1A1 Tank) $7,862,454 36.95%
A1503 (AN/TPS-59) $4,011,073 45.03%
E0947 (LAV-25) $3,072,943 51.22%
D1158 (M1123 HMMWV) $2,146,274 55.55%
E0665 (M198) $1,765,677 59.10%
D0198 (MK23/25 MTVR) $1,693,849 62.52%
A2525 (TSQ-23) $1,629,310 65.80%
E1378 (M88A2 Tank Rec) $1,463,880 68.75%
D1125 (TOW Carrier) $1,321,497 71.41%
MARFORPAC "Heavy Hitters" as a % of Total Part Charges
 
Table 7.   MARFORPAC “Heavy Hitters” as a Percentage of Total Part Charges 
MARFORCOM’s top 10 TAMCNs differ from the Marine Corps as a whole by 
one TAMCN. MARFORCOM’s top 10 list includes the E0942 Antitank Light Armored 
Vehicle instead of the A2525 Tactical Air Operations Module. MARFORCOM, like 
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MARFORPAC, directs approximately 70 percent of its part charges on 10 TAMCNs. 
Figure 12 shows the part charges of the top 10 TAMCNs, and Table 8 shows the top 10 























Figure 12.   MARFORCOM Average Annual Part Charge Expenditures on “Heavy 
Hitters” 
TAMCN
Average Annual Part 
Charges
Cumulative 
Percentage of Total 
Part Charges
E1888 (M1A1 Tank) $10,196,269 33.45%
E0846 (AAVP7A1) $4,252,966 47.41%
E0947 (LAV-25) $1,267,505 51.57%
D1125 (TOW Carrier) $939,494 54.65%
E0665 (M198) $937,814 57.73%
A1503 (AN/TPS-59) $937,783 60.80%
D0209 (MK48A1 LVS) $805,193 63.45%
D1158 (M1123 HMMWV) $751,244 65.91%
E0942 (LAV-AT) $705,303 68.22%
D0198 (MK23/25 MTVR) $673,180 70.43%
MARFORCOM "Heavy Hitters" as a % of Total Part Charges
 
Table 8.   MARFORCOM “Heavy Hitters” as a Percentage of Total Part Charges 
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MARFORRES’ top 10 TAMCNs differ from the Marine Corps as a whole by 
three TAMCNs. MARFORRES’ top 10 list includes the A0807 Satellite Terminal, 
A1500 Radar and E0935 TOW Launcher. Its top 10 list does not include the D0209 LVS, 
D1125 TOW HMMWV and E0848 Amphibious Assault Vehicle. Unlike the other 
MARFORs and the Marine Corps as a whole, MARFORES directs approximately 63 
percent of its part charge expenditures on 10 TAMCNs. Figure 13 shows the part charges 
of the top 10 TAMCNs, and Table 9 shows the top 10 TAMCNs as a percentage of total 





























Average Annual Part 
Charges
Cumulative 
Percentage of Total 
Part Charges
E1888 (M1A1 Tank) $1,506,755 21.49%
A1503 (AN/TPS-59) $616,700 30.29%
E0947 (LAV-25) $473,714 37.04%
D1158 (M1123 HMMWV) $372,666 42.36%
A2525 (TSQ-23) $325,497 47.00%
E0665 (M198) $275,109 50.92%
E0935 (M220E4 TOW) $236,436 54.30%
A0807 (AN/USC-65 Sat) $225,000 57.51%
D0198 (MK23/25 MTVR) $206,689 60.45%
A1500 (AN/TPS-63B) $146,286 62.54%
MARFORRES "Heavy Hitters" as a % of Total Part Charges
 
Table 9.   MARFORRES “Heavy Hitters” as a Percentage of Total Part Charges. 
B. INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
1. Policy Response Model 
The standard test for a model’s utility is to examine the actual data vs. the 
predicted data. A perfect fit exists when all data points fall on the regression line. Since 
our regression line did not produce a perfect fit, 95 percent confidence bands were 
included for an individual prediction, shown in Figure 14. The vast majority of the data 
fell between the confidence bands. The data that fell outside the confidence band are 
known as outliers. A preliminary analysis revealed that data errors or low inventory 
quantities are likely the cause for the outliers; however, a more in-depth analysis is 
needed and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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Figure 14.   Policy Response Model Scatter Plot 
This policy response model is best suited to understand an explanatory variable’s 
effect on part charges, holding all other variables in the model constant. One can use this 
policy response model as a tool for predicting the change in one explanatory variable, 
holding other explanatory variables constant. The results in Table 10 provide the 
following cost estimating relationships: 
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Explanatory Variable Coefficient Lower bound Upper bound Std Error t_statistic
Constant 100.852 80.059 121.645 10.609 9.507
LN(Inventory) 0.826 0.754 0.899 0.037 22.335
LN(Mean days between 
maintenance) -0.525 -0.696 -0.353 0.087 -6.002
LN(Average TAMCN 
cost) 0.605 0.532 0.678 0.037 16.292
Average IOC year -0.050 -0.061 -0.040 0.005 -9.339
SECREP* 1.828 1.641 2.015 0.095 19.162
Armored Personnel 
Carrier* 0.474 0.120 0.828 0.181 2.626
Track TAMCNs* 0.810 0.356 1.265 0.232 3.495
Alpha TAMCNs* 0.615 0.342 0.887 0.139 4.420
Bravo TAMCNs* 0.382 0.126 0.638 0.131 2.921
Charlie TAMCNs* -3.037 -4.171 -1.903 0.578 -5.251
Delta TAMCNs* 0.383 0.105 0.661 0.142 2.700
MARFORCOM TAMCNs* 0.242 0.030 0.454 0.108 2.242
MARFORPAC TAMCNs* 0.532 0.315 0.750 0.111 4.803
Dependent variable: LN (consumable part charges + SECREP part charges)





Table 10.   Policy Response Model 
 LN (inventory). A 1 percent increase in inventory results in a .83 percent 
increase in part charges. 
 LN (mean days between maintenance). A 1 percent increase in mean 
days between maintenance results in a .53 percent decrease in part 
charges. 
 LN (average TAMCN cost). A 1 percent increase in average TAMCN 
cost results in a .61 percent increase in part charges. 
 Average IOC year. A 1-year increase in a TAMCN’s average IOC year 
results in a 5 percent decrease in part charges. 
 SECREP indicator. TAMCNs with SECREP part charges incur 183 
percent more part charges than TAMCNs with only consumable part 
charges. 
 APC indicator. TAMCNs classified as APCs incur 47 percent more part 
charges than all other TAMCNs. 
 Tracks indicator. TAMCNs classified as Tracks incur 81 percent more 
part charges than all other TAMCNs. 
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 Alpha TAMCN indicator. Alpha TAMCNs incur 62 percent more part 
charges, using Echo TAMCNs as the reference variable. 
 Bravo TAMCN indicator. Bravo TAMCNs incur 38 percent more part 
charges, using Echo TAMCNs as the reference variable. 
 Charlie TAMCN indicator. Charlie TAMCNs incur 300 percent less part 
charges, using Echo TAMCNs as the reference variable.  
 Delta TAMCN indicator. Delta TAMCNs incur 38 percent more part 
charges, using Echo TAMCNs as the reference variable. 
 MARFORCOM indicator. TAMCNs in MARFORCOM incur 24 
percent more part charges, using MARFORRES as the reference variable. 
 MARFORPAC indicator. TAMCNs in MARFORPAC incur 53 percent 
more part charges, using MARFORRES as the reference variable. 
2. AR Forecasting Model 
This study’s primary goal was to create a policy response model; however, this 
study also developed an AR forecasting model. Table 11 summarizes the AR forecasting 
regression results. It shows modestly different explanatory variable coefficients, with a 
resulting larger R2, which means that the AR forecasting model explains more of the 
variation in part charges than the policy response model. Table 11 also includes ˆ  (rho-
hat), which takes into account the serial correlation of the residual at time t and time t-1. 
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Parameter Estimate Lower bound Upper bound Std Error t_statistic
Constant 103.785 76.575 130.995 13.834 7.502
LN(Inventory) 0.824 0.731 0.916 0.047 17.536
LN(Mean days 
between 
maintenance) -0.370 -0.541 -0.199 0.087 -4.239
LN(Average TAMCN 
cost) 0.608 0.517 0.700 0.047 13.072
Average IOC year -0.052 -0.066 -0.038 0.007 -7.440
SECREP* 1.786 1.587 1.985 0.101 17.629
Armored Personnel 
Carrier* 0.595 0.127 1.064 0.238 2.499
Track TAMCNs* 0.839 0.231 1.447 0.309 2.716
Alpha TAMCNs* 0.613 0.257 0.968 0.181 3.393
Bravo TAMCNs* 0.385 0.047 0.722 0.172 2.240
Charlie TAMCNs* -2.973 -4.376 -1.571 0.714 -4.167
Delta TAMCNs* 0.449 0.082 0.816 0.187 2.407
MARFORCOM 
TAMCNs* 0.241 -0.036 0.518 0.141 1.711
MARFORPAC 
TAMCNs* 0.531 0.247 0.816 0.145 3.677
Dependent variable: LN (cosumable part charges + SECREP part charges)





Table 11.   AR Forecasting Model 
Although the AR model produces a higher R2, Figure 15 shows numerous data 
points that fall outside the 95 percent confidence bands for the individual forecast. While 
this AR model is better for predicting total part charges than the policy response model, it 
cannot be used to analyze explanatory variables. 
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Figure 15.   AR Forecasting Model Scatter Plot 
The conclusion of the data analysis section includes a prediction of part charges 
from 2009 through 2010, as shown in Table 12. Again, factors outside the model and 
randomness can result in a good policy response model and a lackluster forecasting 
model. The model takes into account part charge decreases in FY 2008, and predicts a 
reduction in FY 2009 part charges. The model predicts another decrease in part charges 
for 2010, except in MARFORRES.  
 
2008 2009 2010
MARFOR Actual Predicted Predicted
MARFORCOM $27,463,603 $32,907,600 $29,436,286
MARFORPAC $52,238,309 $70,300,780 $66,413,076
MARFORRES $8,385,431 $11,374,899 $11,771,438
Forecasted Part Charges in MERIT
 
Table 12.   Forecasted Part Charges in MERIT 
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VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the conclusion of this thesis, a policy response model as an initial analysis 
accurately reflects the capabilities and limitations of this thesis. The goal was to produce 
a performance-cost model that would provide HQMC I&L with forecasted part charges 
(by MARFOR) for comparison with the MARFORs’ annual budget submissions. The 
authors attempted to produce this type of model, but the underlying requirement is 
accurate and reliable data, which cannot be emphasized enough. Cost estimating 
relationships are only as valid as their underlying data. This study highlights the need to 
capture both part charges and the values of potential explanatory variables properly. The 
following section lists conclusions and recommendations for future action: 
 The need for consistency between MERIT, VAMOSC, and budget 
submissions. MERIT, VAMOSC, and the annual budget submission each 
has unique accounting rules. Consequently, historical aggregate part 
charges differ significantly, depending on the source. Furthermore, when 
this study deconstructed the parts charges into individual TAMCNs, 
MARFORs, SECREPs, and consumables, the discrepancies were quite 
large. MERIT and VAMOSC should align their data for data consistency. 
It is ultimately VAMOSC data that OSD looks at for budget submissions. 
 Planners should pull OPTEMPO data from operators. When an 
artillery section chief inputs rounds-fired into his reports, planners should 
be able to go to a central database and access his information. Operators, 
not maintenance personnel, currently record reliable OPTEMPO data. For 
example, a Motor Transport Dispatcher must update a “miles driven” log 
every time a vehicle leaves the motor pool. The Motor Transport 
Operations Chief regularly inspects this log, and then forwards it to his 
higher command. Artillery chiefs, tanks chiefs, and other operators all 
place great importance on recording accurate OPTEMPO data. On the 
other hand, using-unit maintenance personnel are concerned about 
repairing equipment, and do not have any incentives to record proper 
meter reading when filling out EROs. In conclusion, this study did not find 
a significant relationship between OPTEMPO and part charges; however, 
using reliable OPTEMPO is the only way to way to validate OTEMPO’s 
effect on part charges. 
 Conduct follow on studies of deployed units and MARFORSOC. 
Deployed units experience both higher OPTEMPO and more austere 
environments. Consequently, different cost estimating relationships likely 
exist. Additionally, deployed units might spend the bulk of their 
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maintenance funds on different TAMCNs than they do when in garrison. 
For example, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, which is 
prevalent in Iraq, did not make the top 10 list in any of the MARFORs. 
MARFORSOC is another unit that likely spends maintenance funds 
differently than the regular MARFORs, because it has a different mission. 
MARFORSOC probably spends more maintenance funds on 
communication equipment and light vehicles than it does on heavy armor. 
This study estimates that planners have sufficient data to begin 
MARFORSOC part charge analysis by the end of 2010. 
 Repair the raw MIMMS and SASSY master data repository caused 
by the ATLASS II data transfer. Finding accurate reliable data was 
difficult during the data collection phase. The authors looked into Raw 
MIMMS and SASSY data for the years 2002–2008 and were informed 
that data from the years 2002–2004 was inconsistent due to 
MARFORCOM was using ATLASS II, while all other MARFORs were 
using ATLASS I. When the data was transferred from ATLASS II to 
MIMMS/SASSY, the computer system entered “extended price” (quantity 
times unit price) in the “unit price” field, which resulted in a double 
counting error. If this data could be scrubbed and fixed, an additional three 
years of historical data would be applied to the database. 
 SECREP data in MERIT should include MRP credits and payments 
to LIS contractors. Finding accurate SECREP data is an essential piece 
to capturing the true part charges associated with intermediate level 
maintenance. The authors found that MERIT provided the most accurate 
SECREP part charge data. When the IMA fixes a SECREP, this data is 
captured under “repair costs” in the total support cost tab 
(MARCORLOGCOM, 2009). When the RIP procures a SECREP via the 
MRP process and keypunches a ZBR (buy transaction), this data is 
captured under “SECREP Procurement” (MARCORLOGCOM, 2009) in 
the total support cost tab. The MRP credits transferred or reversed from 
the source of supply to the RIP is not captured under the SECREP 
procurement section of MERIT. This is a problem because the full 
purchase price of the SECREP is accounted for and not the exchange 
price, which is the actual cost. When the RIP releases an unserviceable 
SECREP to the LIS contractors for repair via a ZBE (release) transaction, 
the full unit price of the SECREP being transferred is captured under 
SECREP procurement in MERIT’s Total Support Cost tab 
(MARCORLOGCOM, 2009). The LIS contractors are paid using a MIPR 
and this data is stored in the SABRS system. This MIPR transaction is not 
recorded in MERIT. Instead of accounting for the ZBE transaction, one 
needs to look into SABRS to account for the actual cost of services 
performed by the contractor. If this data could be captured under SECREP 
procurement in the total support cost tab, the total cost of SECREPS is 
captured.  
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 Create a TAMCN master database. Having the following variables 
readily available and in one location increases the accuracy and credibility 
of future studies. Instead of creating a whole new database, one should 
look into augmenting this information with either MERIT or the SOE 
website. The following variables should be included. 
 IOC Year: This is an important variable to help determine the age 
of a TAMCN and when it was introduced into the Marine Corps 
inventory system. TFSMS was the source for IOC year. The 
authors found that this data had gaps and was incomplete. For 
example, while all TAMCNs have an IOC year, TFSMS did not 
list an IOC year for some TAMCNS. It is recommend that all 
serviceable TAMCNS have their IOC year input. 
 Average Age: This data requires a fielding schedule for every 
TAMCN variant and needs to be continuously updated for any 
changes. There needs to be one standard equation for calculating 
average age. The benefits to having average data is that one can 
determine the average age of the fleet and project the amount of 
funding required for overhaul and part charges with the assumption 
that as equipment ages, it is most likely that more is spent on part 
charges. 
 TAMCN procurement cost: Having the TAMCN unit cost by 
variant is significant in determining the average unit cost of the 
TAMCN, but is not currently available in a single database. This 
data can be used in regression analysis to determine if a TAMCN’s 
procurement costs affects future part charge expenditures. The 
higher the TAMCN’s procurement cost, the more likely spending 
is increased on SECREPS and consumable parts.  
 OPTEMPO by TAMCN: An accurate estimate of OPTEMPO 
could be a strong indicator of usage, and in turn, part charges. This 
variable was not used due to inaccuracies of MIMMS OPTEMPO 
data. The method for capturing this data needs to be improved 
before it can be applied to this master database.  
 Inventory by MEF: Inventory levels by MEF are needed to 
determine the size of the MEF. Having inventory levels broken 
down by TAMCN and by year provides a picture as to the growth 
of a MEF. This is with the assumption that more TAMCNs lead to 
higher part charge expenditures.  
 Planners should further analyze the top 10 TAMCNs that consume the 
most part charges using the techniques applied in this study. The top 10 
and 20 TAMCNs account for approximately 70 percent and 80 percent of 
part charges, respectively, so planners should spend time developing cost 
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estimating relationships for these TAMCNs. Planners might use cost 
factors to estimate the aggregate part charges of the remaining 208 
TAMCNs. 
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APPENDIX. LISTING OF TAMCNS 
Table of Marine Corps Readiness Evaluation System (MARES) Equipment 
 TAMCN FA CODE WSC Nomenclature MEE 
A0013 13 8S Theater Battle Management Core System AN/TYY-2 AN/TYY-2
A0020 13 AB Direct Air Support Central, Airborne System  (DASC, AS)   
A0021 13 6A Communications Data Link System, TYQ-101A TYQ-101A
A0025 13 5T Communications Platform,  Air Defense (ADCP) AN/MSQ-124
A0060 19 AE Joint Services Workstation, AN/TSQ-220 (V) AN/TSQ-220
A0067 9 DL Radio Set, AN/MRC-148
A0068 10 IY Radio Set, Tactical Long Haul Digital Link-11, AN/GRC-256 AN/GRC-256
A0069 9 0G Radio Set, Vehicle, Dual VAA, AN/VRC-111
A0075 9 VM AN/VRC-104
A0116 16 OJ I PADS
A0122 16 9Y PHOENIX PHOENIX
A0124 6 2Y Remote Subscriber Access Module (RSAM) AN/TTC-63
A0125 6 1Y Deployable End Office Suite
A0126 9 VM Multiband Frequency, Vehicle Mounted, Radio System AN/VRC-103 
(V)2
A0132 6 UY Deployable Integrated Transport Suite (DITS)
A0138 19 AE Tactical Exploitation Group - Remote Workstation TEG-RWS
A0139 10 C9 Radio Set, AN/TRC-209
A0149 9 E3 Antenna COMM TRL Mounted AS-4429D AS-4429D
A0153 9 -- Radio Set, AN/MRC-142C
A0170 19 -- AN/TSQ 226 (V)3 Trojan Spirit AN/TSQ 226
A0172 7 HZ DDS-R/M PWR Module (PM) 
A0173 7 HZ DDS-R/M COMM Security Module (CSM)
A0174 7 HZ DDS-R/M LAN Service Module (LSM)
A0175 7 HZ DDS-R/M Configuration Module (CM) Laptop IBM
A0176 7 HZ DDS-R/M LAN Extension Module ON-704/TYC
A0177 7 HZ DDS-R/M APP SVR Module (ASM) AN/TYQ-147
A0180 13 8A AN/TYQ-145 Beyond Line of Sight Gateway
A0182 19 -- Tactical One Roof
A0197 7 6J DDS-R/M Data Storage Module (DSM) DSM
A0234 7 IT SWAN D (V)1 SWAN D (V)1
A0241 7 3G SWAN D (V)2 SWAN D (V)2
A0242 7 3J Satellite Communication Subsystem SCS
A0243 7 3N SWAN D Network Package SWAN D
A0244 7 3O Network Management System NMS
A0254 10 OL Combat Ops Center, Set III - AN/TSQ-239(V)3 
A0255 10 OM Combat Ops Center, Set IV - AN/TSQ-239(V)4
A0273 9 6K Radio Set, Vehicular, DVA, AN/VRC-110
A0282 7 3Y Team Portable Collection System Multi-Platform Capable TPCSMPC
A0425 7 8N AN/GSC-68(V)1/Mounted Digital Automated Communications 
Terminal (MDACT)
A0499 7 Y3 Digital Technical Control (DTC), Facility, AN/TSQ-227
A0806   5 B9 Lightweight Multiband Satellite Terminal (LMST) HUB AN/USC-
65(V)1
A0807 5 B9 Lightweight Multiband Satellite Terminal  (LMST) Mini-HUB AN/USC-
65(V)2
A0814 5 BH Communications Terminal, AN/TSC-93C (V)1
A0873 13 U3 Server, INTEL OPS (IOS_OPS)  
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 TAMCN FA CODE WSC Nomenclature MEE 
A0880 14 EN AN/UPX-37 Interrogator Set AN/UPX-37




A0886 7 85 JT Enhanced Core COMM SYS (JECCS)
A0921 19 G4 AN/TSQ 226 (V)1 Trojan Spirit Lite AN/TSQ 226 
(V)1
A0932 19 ID IOW
A0940 7 4X PFED
A0966 19 5J Mobile EW Support System, AN/MLQ-36
A1225 10 BN AN/TSQ-158A/EPLRS Network Manager (ENM)
A1260 5 4A GPSS-DAGR GPSS-DAGR
A1380 5 8H Antenna, Lightweight High Gain X-Band (LHGXA), AS-4429               
A1440 43 BP Radar Set, Fire Finder, AN/TPQ-36/AN/TPQ-46 TPQ-46
A1500 14 GS Radar Set, AN/TPS-63B
A1503 14 BQ Radar Set, LW3D, AN/TPS-59(V)3 AN/TPS-
59(V)3




A1818 10 56 Radio Set, AN/GRC-171B(V)4
A1954 8 5D Radio Terminal Set ,AN/MRC-142B
A1955 8 SD Radio Terminal Set, AN/MRC-142A
A1957 9 4R Radio Set, AN/MRC-145A
A2042 10 8T High Frequency Manpack Radio, AN/PRC-150
A2044 10 E3 Radio Set, Manpack, PRC-148(V)1
A2068 10 8T AN/PRC-117F/Radio Set, Multiband, Falcon II 
A2070 10 2Z Radio Set, Manpack, AN/PRC-119A
A2075 9 2Z Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-89D
A2076 9 2Z Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-90D
A2077 9 2Z Radio Set, Vehicular AN/VRC-91D
A2078 9 2Z Radio Set, Vehicular - AN/VRC92D
A2079 10 2Z Radio Set, Manpack, AN/PRC-119F
A2152 10 Z4 AN/VSQ2C/Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) 
A2179 8 FW Radio Terminal Digital, Troposcatter, AN/TRC-170
A2390 13 8A Sector Anti-Air Warfare FAC, AN/TYQ-87
A2525 13 BY Tactical Air Operations Module, (TAOM), AN/TYQ-23(V)4 AN/TSQ-
23(V)4
A2533 7 HZ Data Distribution System, AN/TSQ-228 (V)3
A2534 7 6G Data Distribution System, AN/TSQ-228 (V)2 AN/TSQ-228 
(V)2
A2535 7 7U Tactical (Gateway ) Data NetworkAN/TSQ-222
A2538 7 7U AN/TSQ-228(V)1/Data Distribution System, Tactical Server (DDS) 
A2551 19 2J Tactical Command System, AN/USC-55A
A2555 13 51 AFATDS
A2560 13 4X Target Loc, Desig & Hand-Off Sys (TLDHS)(BLK II) - AN/PSQ19A 
A2628 19 7G Tactical Control and Analysis Center, Transportable TCAC TW
A2634 19 6P Tactical Control and Analysis Center, (TCAC-RAWS)





 TAMCN FA CODE WSC Nomenclature MEE 
A3252 19 IE UAV System, Dragon Eye
A3270 13 6A Communications Interface System, AN/MRQ-12(V)3 AN/MRQ-
12(V)3
A8018 97 HE Interrogator Computer, TSEC/KIR-1C
A8019 97 HK Transponder Computer, TSEC/Kit-1C
A8038 97 HL Electronic Key Generator, TSEC/KG-40A/P
A8072 97 6H Remote Rekey Equipment
A9001 97 8N Computer Set, Digital (Blue Force Tracker)
B0001 21 MU Air Conditioner, MCS Horizontal, 60HZ, 9K BTU   
B0003 21 JB AC, 1.5 Ton, 60HZ
B0004 21 JC AC, 1.5 Ton, 400HZ
B0006 21 JE AC, 3 Ton, 400HZ
B0008 21 JH AC, 5T, 60K 
B0012 21 2U Environmental Control Unit (Air Conditioner) 18K BTU/HR, 400HZ
B0014 21 IZ Environmental Control Unit (Air Conditioner)
B0018 21 53 Integrated Trailer ECU
B0025 29 0Y Hydroseeder, Trailer Mounted
B0026 29 N1 Hydroseeder, Skid Mounted
B0035 29 3T Hardened Engineer Vehicle (BUFFALO)         
B0038 29 B1 All Terrain Crain (ATC) MAC-50
B0039 29 1Z Airfield Damage Repair (ADR) Kit-GBE Runway REP
B0063 29 0D 624K TRAM
B0074 21 4O AC, .75 Ton
B0114 24 MK Boat, Bridge Erection, USCSBMK3 USCSBMK3
B0152 24 JT Bridge, Medium Girder (MGB), Dry Gap MGB2
B0155 24 2K Bridge, Floating Ribbon, 70-Ton FBR-70
B0160 29 3W Assault Breacher Vehicle ABV
B0392 29 JV Container Handler, RT, KALMAR
B0476 29 IG Detecting Set, Mine, AN/PSS-14 PSS14
B0589 23 3Q Excavator Combat, M9 ACE M9 ACE
B0675 25 KF Fuel Dispensing System, Tactical, Airfield, M1966 TAFDS
B0685 25 KG Fuel System Amphibious Assault, M69HC AAFS
B0730 20 KH Generator Set, 3KW, 60HZ, Skid-Mtd MEP831A          
B0891 20 KK Generator Set, Skid Mtd, 10KW/60HZ, TQG MEP803A          
B0921 20 KL Generator Set, Skid Mtd, 10KW/400HZ, TQG MEP 813
B0930 20 OZ Generator Set, 60HZ, MMG 25
B0953 20 7M Generator Set, 30KW, 60 HZ, Skid Mtd, MEP-005A/805A/B
B0971 20 7N Generator Set, 400HZ, 60KW, 400HZ, Skid Mtd, TQG 815
B0980 20 YY Generator Set, 60HZ, MEP 513A
B1016 20 KN Generator Set, 60KW, 400HZ, Skid Mounted, MEP-816A
B1021 20 KP Generator Set, 60 KW, 60 Hz, Skid Mounted, MEP-006A/806B
B1045 20 KM Generator Set, 100KW, 60HZ, SKID-MTD, TQG-MEP-807A
B1082 23 FU Grader, Road, Motorized-130G
B1135 25 KQ Refueling System, Expedient, HELO-81A5013A0000
B1315 29 J8 Mine Clearing Launcher, MK-154, MOD 0 MK-154
B1580 25 KU Fuel Pump Module (SIXCON)
B1785 23 LZ Roller, Compactor, Vibratory, Self-Propelled-CS563D  
 66
 TAMCN FA CODE WSC Nomenclature MEE 
B2085 25 MT Storage, Tank, Module, Fuel (SIXCON)
B2086 25 M3 Storage, Tank, Module, Water (SIXCON) MWT166
B2127 33 8P Sweeper, Rotary, Vehicle Mounting
B2462 23 7E Tractor, Medium, Full-Tracked D7G, Caterpillar D7G
B2483 23 2 Loader, Backhoe (BHL)
B2561 26 MC Forklift, Extended Boom
B2566 26 KV Light Capacity, Rough Terrain Forklift
B2567 23 Z2 Tractor, Rubber Tire, Articulated Steer, MP (TRAM)-644E TRAM 644E
B2605 29 IH Tactical Water Purification System (TWPS) TWPS
C2278 98 -- Oxygen Mask
C2282 99 7V NBC Reconnaissance System (FOX) M93 FOX
C2286 98 -- Oxygen System, Portable
C2288 98 -- Re-Breather Unit, Oxygen, Portable - Phaos, Oxcon
C4185 98 1J Breathing Apparatus, Underwater-MK25 MOD2
C4549 98 IK Device Propulsion, Diver
C5649 98 IM Parachute Personnel, Maneuverable (MMPS)
C5901 98 4V Raiding Craft, Cmbt, Rubber, Inflatable, (CRRC) F470 Full up
D0001 30 SR Truck Utility, Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) M1114
D0003 31 I1 Truck, Armored, 7 ton Cargo, AMK23  
D0004 31 Z1 Truck, Armored, 7 Ton Cargo w/ Winch, AMK25  
D0005 31 Y1 Truck, Armored, 7 Ton Ext L WHLB, AMK27  
D0006 31 X1 Truck, Armored, 7 Ton Ext L WHLB w/ Winch, AMK28  
D0007 31 X1 Truck, Armored, Dump, 7 Ton, AMK29  
D0008 31 F2 Truck, Armored, Dump, 7 Ton w/ Winch, AMK30  
D0009 31 U1 Truck, Tractor, 7T, w/o Winch - MK31
D0013 31 F2 Tractor, MTVR,  w/o Winch, Armored - AMK31
D0015 31 F2 Truck, Armored, Wrecker, 7 Ton w/ Winch, AMK36 AMK36
D0022 29 IN Truck, Utility, Expanded Capacity, Enhanced, 11,500 GVW, 4x4, 
M1152 (2-Door)
D0025 29 IQ MRAP JERRV, 4X4
D0027 29 IR MRAP JERRV, 6X6
D0030 30 OQ Truck, Utility, Expanded Capacity, Armored Carrier, M1151
D0031 29 5A Truck, Utility, Expanded Capacity, G2/GP Vehicle
D0033 30 5G Truck, Utility, Expanded Capacity, Enhanced, Armored, 2-Door
D0034 29 5E Truck, Utility, Expanded Capacity, CMD&CNTRL GP
D0081 26 -- Trailer, General Purpose, 4 Ton, 4 Wheel, MK18A1
D0198 31 F2 Truck, Cargo, 7 Ton, W/O Winch (MTVR) MK23/MK25
D0209 32 QE Power Unit, Front, 4x4, MK 48, Mod 0 MK48A1
D0215 32 RY Semi-Trailer, Refueler, 5000 GAL-MK970A MK970A
D0235 32 RZ Semi-Trailer, 40-Ton Low-Bed, 12- Wheel, M870 M870A2
D0861 32 QE Trailer, Cargo, Resupply F/HIMARS, MK38
D0876 32 QE Trailer, Powered, Container Hauler 4x4, MK14
D0877 32 QE Trailer, Powered, Wrecker/Recovery, 4x4-MK15A1 Mod 0 MK15A1 Mod 
0
D0878 32 QE Trailer, Powered, 5th Wheel 4x4, MK16, Mod 0 MK16
D0880 31 Q6 Trailer, Tank, Water, 400 Gal, M149A2
D0881 32 QE Trailer, Ribbon Bridge-MK18A1 MK18A1  
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 TAMCN FA CODE WSC Nomenclature MEE 
D1001 30 QP Truck, Ambulance, 4 Litter, Armored, 1 ¼ Ton, HMMWV, M997
D1002 30 QQ Truck, Ambulance, 2 Litter, Soft Top, 1 ¼ Ton, HMMWV, M1035
D1062 31 F2 Truck, Cargo, 7 Ton, XLWB, MK27/MK28
D1063 43 F2 MTVR, MK37 (MK27 w/ crane)
D1064 33 SG Trk, Fire Fighting, Aircraft and Structure, A/S32P-19A A/S32P-19A
D1073 31 F2 Truck, RTAA, Dump, 7 Ton w/Winch
D1125 48 QR Truck, Utility, TOW Carrier, HMMWV, M1045/M1046 TOW Carrier
D1158 30 SF Truck, Utility, Cargo, Troop Carrier, HMMWV, M1123
D1159 30 QS Truck, Utility, Armored Carrier, W/SA, 2 ¼ Ton, HMMWV
D1160 30 8V Interim Fast Attack Vehicle (IFAV), 04751E
D1213 31 F2 Truck Wrecker, MTVR, MK-36, MK-36
E0006 43 4C Illuminator, Infared (IZLID 1000P)
E0020 47 4D Scout Sniper Medium Range Night Sight
E0055 48 76 Launcher, Tubular F/GM(TOW), M41A1 SABER
E0149 40 UG Bridge, Scissor for AVLB
E0150 40 UJ Launcher, Bridge, Armored Vehicle, M60A1
E0180 43 UH Circle, Aiming
E0207 48 4D Command Launch Unit, Javelin M98A1 M98A1
E0311 47 -- M14/Sniper Rifle, EMR 
E0330 48 UP Sight, Thermal, AN/UAS-12C Hybrid
E0665 43 U7 Howitzer, Medium, Towed 155MM, M198 M198
E0671 43 6F Howitzer, Light Weight Medium, Towed, M777 M777
E0796 41 X2 Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Command/Communications, 
AAVC7A1
AAVC7A1
E0846 41 X3 Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Personnel, AAVP7A1 AAVP7A1
E0856 41 X4 Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Recovery, AAVR7A1 AAVR7A1
E0915 48 UA Launcher, Assault Rocket, 83mm, MK153, Mod 0
E0935 48 XR Launcher, Tubular F/GM (TOW), M220E4 M220E4
E0942 42 VM Light Armored Vehicle, Anti-Tank, LAV-AT LAV-AT
E0946 42 VM Light Armored Vehicle, Command/Control, LAV-C2 LAV-C2
E0947 42 VM Light Armored Vehicle, 25mm, LAV-25 LAV-25
E0948 42 VM Light Armored Vehicle, Logistics, LAV-L LAV-L
E0949 42 VM Light Armored Vehicle, Mortar, LAV-M LAV-M 
E0950 42 VM Light Armored Vehicle, Maint/Recovery, LAV-R LAV-R
E0980 45 VD Machine Gun, Cal .50, Browning, HB Flexible - M2
E0984 45 8X Machine Gun, Cal .50
E0989 45 58 Machine Gun, Medium, 7.62MM, Ground Version - M240B
E0994 45 UB Machine Gun, 40MM - MK19 MOD3
E1030 48 TB GLTD II Target Designator
E1048 48 -- Vector 21
E1065 46 V9 Mortar, 60MM, M224
E1095 46 B3 Mortar, 81mm, M252 M252
E1145 43 8F Velocity System, Muzzle (MVS)
E1210 43 KD Position Azimuth Determination System (PADS)
E1378 40 XY Recovery Vehicle, Heavy, Full-Tracked, M88A2 M88A2  
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 TAMCN FA CODE WSC Nomenclature MEE 
E1460 47 WC Rifle, Sniper, 7.62MM, W/Equipment
E1475 47 4J Rifle, Scoped, Special Application, .50 CAL
E1500 43 8Y High Mobility Artillery Rocket System HIMARS
E1839 49 G1 Advanced Man Portable Air Defense System
E1888 40 UK Tank, Combat, Full-Tracked, 120mm Gun, M1A1 M1A1
8B
E1975 48 7C Sight, Weapon, Thermal, Medium (MTWS)
E1976 48 7C Sight, Weapon, Thermal, Heavy ((HTWS)
E1906
40
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